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 109,931 people nationwide were on the United Network for Organ 
Sharing waiting list at 3:20pm on Wednesday, December 1, 2010.1  There 
were 8,477 donors from January until July, 2010.2  This discrepancy leaves 
tens of thousands of people to die while awaiting a transplant.  However, in 
1999 and 2000 combined, an estimated 260,000 people died in 
Pennsylvania alone.3  These deaths would seemingly leave more than 
enough presumptive donors4 to cover the demand for vital organs created 
throughout the entire country.5  Moreover, a single donor6 is capable of 
saving the lives of four individuals and improving the lives of more than 
five additional individuals.7  Consequently, the number of presumptive 
organ donors far exceeds the number of donors actually needed to meet the 
                                                 
* This paper was written for a seminar class in Advanced Issues in Property during the 
fall 2010 semester at Marquette University Law School.  I thank Professor Kali Murray for 
the insightful knowledge she provided me with.  I dedicate this paper to Tim Reck for the 
tremendous gift of life he left for such fortunate individuals.  May all who were lucky 
enough to have known him be continuously inspired by his courage and his generosity.  
1 UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org/ (last visited Dec. 1, 
2010).  This list coordinates the country’s organ transplant system through a contractual 
agreement with the federal government.  Id. 
2 Id. 
3 Samantha A. Wilcox, Presumed Consent Organ Donation in Pennsylvania: One 
Small Step for Pennsylvania, One Giant Leap for Organ Donation, 107 DICK. L. REV. 935, 
936 (2003). 
4 The term “presumptive donors” refers to either living individuals who are healthy 
enough to be capable of donating organs upon their death, or decedents who were healthy 
enough while alive such that their organs would have been capable of being transplanted at 
the time of their death, assuming their cause of death did not subsequently prevent the 
possibility of donation.  “Presumptive donors” are not necessarily legally acknowledged as 
having consented to organ donation.  They are, or were, merely capable of donating 
organs.  Alternatively, those who are legally acknowledged as having consented to 
donation are referred to as “donors” within this Article, regardless of whether they have 
already physically donated an organ to a donee.   
5 Wilcox, supra note 3, at 936. 
6 “Donors,” within this Article, refers only to cadaver donors and not to living donors. 
7 Wilcox, supra note 3, at 936.  Each single donor is capable of saving four lives 
through his or her ability to, ideally, donate one heart, two lungs, and one liver.  
Additionally, the same single donor is capable of significantly improving the quality of life 
of several more people through his or her potential to donate two kidneys, one pancreas, 
two corneas, as well as bones, skin, and other tissue.  Id. 
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demand.8  This demand is not being met as a direct result of presumptive 
donors neglecting to declare donative intent prior to death.   
 Legislative attempts to minimize the gap between the number of 
presumptive donors and the supply of organs actually donated have been 
widespread at the international level.9  A key variable within legislative 
attempts is the level of consent required to turn a presumptive donor into an 
actual donor.  The majority of states in the United States require that an 
individual “opt-in” to be recognized as a donor.  Opt-in requirements oblige 
each individual to specific, affirmative action indicating their unambiguous 
intent to donate.10  If an individual chooses not to do so, the default rule 
states that the presumptive donor will not be recognized as an actual donor.  
Recently, however, a minority of states in the United States moved toward 
the other extreme by adopting an “opt-out” approach in particular 
circumstances.11  The default rule in an opt-out approach considers 
everyone to be a willing donor.  Therefore, inaction demonstrates an 
individual’s consent to donate.  Where a given jurisdiction falls upon the 
spectrum between the two extremes is directly related to the percentage of 
consenting individuals within the given locale.  Specifically, the countries 
that follow strong opt-out laws have the highest number of donors per 
capita while countries that follow strong opt-in laws tend to have the 
lowest.12   
 The United States enacted the federal Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
of 1968 (UAGA) which follows the opt-in approach.13  If a presumptive 
donor fails to take an affirmative step declaring donative intent, it is 
assumed he or she does not want to be an organ donor.  Every state, as well 
as Washington, D.C., has adopted the UAGA or a close variation.14    
Nevertheless, several states have adopted statutes at the state level 
that require an opt-out approach for particular donations.  For example, 
fifteen states, including Pennsylvania, use an opt-out approach for corneal 
                                                 
8 Patrick D. Carlson, The 2004 Organ Donation Recovery and Improvement Act: How 
Congress Missed an Opportunity to Say “Yes” to Financial Incentives for Organ 
Donation, 23 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 136, 136-37 (2006). 
9 Abena Richards, Don’t Take Your Organs to Heaven… Heaven Knows We Need 
Them Here: Another Look at the Required Response System, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 365, 
388-89 (2006). 
10 Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism is Not an 
Oxymoron, 70 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1159, 1192 (2003). 
11 The “opt-out” approach is commonly referred to in literature as the “presumed 
consent” approach.  However, for purposes of parallelism and clarity in this Paper, I have 
chosen to use the phrase “opt-out” to signify the idea of “presumed consent.” 
12 See Erica Teagarden, Human Trafficking: Legal Issues in Presumed Consent Laws, 
30 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 685, 698-700 (2005). 
13 Wilcox, supra note 3, at 937. 
14 Teagarden, supra note 12, at 694.  
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tissue donation.15  The minimally invasive nature of corneal tissue 
extraction has influenced states’ decisions to utilize the opt-out approach for 
this specific donation.16  As a result of the procedure being only minimally 
invasive, those who see the decedent after the extraction will never know 
that anything was removed from the decedent’s body.17  While somewhat 
controversial, this approach avoids particular religious objections and 
prevents families from having to make donative decisions on behalf of the 
decedent shortly after death.  Furthermore, the high degree of perishability 
of corneal tissue18 makes it imperative for a medical examiner to know 
whether to extract corneal tissue from a decedent immediately following the 
time of death in order for the tissue to be usable in repairing a donee’s 
vision. 
 Of course, permitting a medical examiner to extract tissue without 
consent permits tissue to be extracted from all decedents, including 
decedents who believed that extraction of tissue violates religious ideals.  In 
addition, it may be unethical to allow organ or tissue extraction to be 
performed absent the knowledge of the decedent’s family.  Denying the 
family knowledge of the procedure simultaneously denies them the 
opportunity to object to it on the basis of religious or moral ideals that may 
have been important to the decedent.19  Together, the challenges faced by 
states that have adopted the opt-out approach for corneal tissue donation 
indicate the challenges our country would likely face if it were to switch 
from an opt-in approach to an opt-out approach for donations of all organs 
and tissues.  
 Nonetheless, an opt-out approach, rather than an opt-in approach, 
has the greatest impact on the number of preventable deaths that occur due 
to the lack of donated organs.  While significant religious and moral 
concerns exist regarding opt-out procedures, apprehension toward the opt-
out approach could subside if education surrounding opt-out procedures is 
increased.  Opt-out laws do not take away an individual’s right to refrain 
from being considered an organ donor.  Instead, the opt-out approach 
merely requires each individual to make one minor action in declaring his 
or her desire to refrain from donating.  If it is truly important to an 
                                                 
15 Maryellen Liddy, The “New Body Snatchers”: Analyzing the Effect of Presumed 
Consent Organ Donation Laws on Privacy, Autonomy, and Liberty, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
815, 828 (2001). 
16 Michele Goodwin, Formalism and the Legal Status of Body Parts, 2006 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 317, 330 (2006). 
17 Id. 
18 Ronald Smith, Doheny Eye Bank, L.A. TIMES, November 10, 1977, available at 
http://articles.latimes.com/1997/nov/10/local/me-52250. 
19 Goodwin, supra note 16. 
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individual not to donate, it should be insignificant for the individual to take 
a moment, once in his or her lifetime, to legally declare intent not to donate. 
 This Paper looks to increase readers’ awareness of the organ 
shortage while highlighting the stark reality that available cadaver organs 
and tissues exceed the demand for them.  Part I discusses the opt-in 
approach currently utilized in the United States as enacted through the 
UAGA.  Part II looks at the opt-out approach, the variations in which it has 
been adopted, and the corresponding influences it has had on helping to 
meet the demand for organ donations.  This Part also explores the critical 
responses to the opt-out approach, including moral, procedural, religious, 
and ethical concerns.  Lastly, Part III explains how each criticism of the opt-
out approach can be addressed through increasing education surrounding 
opt-out procedures. 
 
I.  OPT-IN APPROACH FAILS TO SIGNIFICANTLY MINIMIZE THE DISCREPANCY 
BETWEEN DONORS AND INDIVIDUALS NEEDING ORGAN DONATIONS 
 
 The opt-in approach is one method of responding to the discrepancy 
between the number of donors and the number of people currently awaiting 
an organ transplant.  The United States follows the opt-in approach, as 
codified within the UAGA, originally adopted in 1968.20  However, this 
discrepancy remained minimally effected by the adoption of the UAGA of 
196821 and, consequently, changes were made that resulted in the 1987 
version which we still follow today.22  The UAGA of 1987 minimizes the 
discrepancy more so than the UAGA of 1968.23 However, the discrepancy 
remains significant in the United States,24 especially relative to countries 
that follow the opt-out approach instead.25 
 
A.  UAGA of 1968 
 
                                                 
20 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act (1968). 
21 See Teagarden, supra note 12, at 694-95 (explains the major obstacles that existed 
within the 1968 version and how, subsequently, the 1978 version eliminated them, which 
resulted in an overall increase in the number of organ donations made). 
22 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act (1987). 
23 See Teagarden, supra note 12, at 694-95. 
24 UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org/ (last visited Dec. 1, 
2010).   
25 See Andrew Hughes, You Get What You Pay For?: Rethinking U.S. Organ 
Procurement Policy in Light of Foreign Models, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 351, 364 
(2009) (Austria, which uses the strictest form of an opt-out approach, “…has had much 
more success in procuring organs, supplying kidneys twice as effectively as the United 
States…”).   
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 Technological advances in the medical field have paralleled 
increasing success rates of organ transplants.  Dr. Joseph Murray 
successfully performed the first invasive transplant in 1954 when he 
removed a kidney from one identical twin and successfully placed it into the 
other.26  From then on, as Abena Richards addresses in her law review 
article discussing the organ shortage, transplantation became commonplace.  
As a result, states began enacting statutes to regulate donation.27  Forty-two 
states had their own version of an organ donation statute by 1968.28  
Consequently, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws passed the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (UAGA) of 196829 in order 
to unify the forty-two different attempts at regulation statutes at the state 
level.30  Every state as well as Washington, D.C. had adopted the UAGA or 
a variation of it by 1973.31 
 The UAGA states that any individual age eighteen or older and of 
sound mind may donate all or any part of his or her body upon death.32  The 
acceptable purposes of donative gifts include contributing to medical or 
dental education, research, and the advancement of medical or dental 
science33, as well as contributing to a transplant need of a donee.34  The 
UAGA requires that presumptive donors “opt-in” by unambiguously 
declaring donative intent, communicated either by will35 or by a document 
other than a will, such as a card designed to be carried by the donor.36  If the 
presumptive donor has not designated his or her donative intent and has not 
unambiguously indicated intent contrary to donation, then the UAGA 
provides a hierarchy of third parties close to the decedent who may provide 
donative consent on the decedent’s behalf.37  The hierarchy increases the 
                                                 
26 Richards, supra note 9, 370-71. 
27 Id. at 371. 
28 Id. 
29 Laurel R. Siegel, Re-Engineering the Laws of Organ Transplantation, 49 EMORY 
L.J. 917, 932 (2000). 
30 Richards, supra note 9, at 371. 
31 Siegel, supra note 29. 
32 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 2(a) (1968). 
33 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 3(1) (1968). 
34 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 3(4) (1968). 
35 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 4(a) (1968). 
36 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 4(b) (1968).  This card must also be signed by the 
presumptive donor.  Id. 
37 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 2(b) (1968).  Consent may be provided on behalf of the 
decedent to donate all or part of the decedent’s body by a third party when the decedent has 
not acted in a way that expresses contrary donative intent.  Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 
2(c) (1968).  The third parties capable of providing consent on behalf of the decedent 
appear in a hierarchy.  Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 2(b) (1968).  Therefore, medical 
personnel are required to attempt to gain consent from the person located at the top of the 
hierarchical list and only when that person is unreachable after a reasonable attempt has 
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chance that a decedent will become a donor by increasing the number of 
people able to provide consent for one single presumptive donor.  In this 
way, the UAGA not only unifies state regulations of organ donation, but it 
also increases the number of organ donors. 
 By 1987, however, the hierarchical list of third parties able to 
provide donative consent on behalf of the decedent was understood to limit 
the number of donations.  It became clear that if the hierarchical list 
expanded, so would the number of organ donations.  This expansion was 
necessary for two reasons.   
First, it was necessary as a response to decedents being legally 
barred from donating only because hospital personnel were unable to 
physically locate parties on the hierarchical list within the relevant donative 
time period.  A particular window of time exists between when the 
presumptive donor is declared dead and when his or her organs are no 
longer capable of being donated.  If consent is not provided by a party on 
the hierarchical list within this window of time, all of the organs that could 
have provided life for others, had consent been provided, go unused.  
Expanding the hierarchical list, therefore, has the ability to increase the 
number of donations made by increasing the likelihood that medical 
personal can physically locate a third party capable of providing consent on 
behalf of the decedent within the relevant donative window of time. 
Second, many people who never objected to being a donor were 
nonetheless failing to act to become one by completing a will or other 
document reflective of donative intent.  Specifically, a poll conducted in 
198538 indicated that seventy-five percent of the American population 
approved of the idea of organ donation.39  A 1993 poll40 indicated that 
sixty-nine percent of Americans would like to donate their organs upon 
their death.41  However, evidence suggests that the number of adults who 
would like to donate does not correspond to the number of adults who are 
registered donors.  In fact, only seventeen percent of American adults carry 
donor cards.42   
Presumptive donors may be unaware of their ability to donate, how 
to become a donor, or the need for donors.  Theoretically, providing 
                                                                                                                            
been made to contact him or her, is the medical personnel allowed to move on to the next 
person on the hierarchical list.  The hierarchy consists, in order, of the decedent’s spouse, 
adult son or daughter, either parent, adult brother or sister, guardian of the person who died 
at the time of death of the decedent, and lastly, any other person authorized or under the 
obligation to dispose of the decedent’s body.  Id. 
38 1985 Gallup Poll. 
39 Siegel, supra note 29, at 944. 
40 1993 Gallup Poll. 
41 Richards, supra note 9, at 368. 
42 Wilcox, supra note 3, at 937.  
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additional education to presumptive donors regarding their ability to donate, 
and the corresponding procedures required to declare donative intent, could 
increase the number of donors; however, the additional education would 
require expending a significant amount of resources.  A less costly way of 
increasing the number of donors, although seemingly less impactful than 
increasing education, is to expand the list of people who can provide 
consent on behalf of a decedent.  This expansion makes up for the many 
presumptive donors who want to donate but fail to take the final affirmative 
step necessary to officially be recognized as donors.   
 
B.  UAGA of 1987 
 
The UAGA of 1987 sought to make up for the pitfalls of the 1968 
version and its failure to significantly impact the organ shortage.43  It did so 
in four significant ways, all of which afforded more opportunities for 
consent to be provided when it otherwise would not have been.  The UAGA 
of 1987: (1) expanded the list of people able to provide consent on behalf of 
the decedent; (2) expanded the ways in which a person could express 
donative intent; (3) granted medical personal new express authority to ask 
for consent from others as well as the presumptive donor him or herself; (4) 
mandated that individuals be asked whether they are donors upon 
admittance to a hospital; and (5) authorized the coroner to provide consent 
on behalf of the decedent in particular scenarios.  
First, the UAGA of 1987, still in effect today, expanded the 
hierarchical list of people capable of providing donative consent on behalf 
of the decedent by adding grandparents.44  This theoretically increased the 
number of people physically available to provide consent during the 
donative window of time, thus increasing the likelihood that a decedent 
becomes a donor.  In addition, it made make up for the many presumptive 
donors who wished to donate but who did not act to designate themselves as 
donors due to a lack of education concerning opt-in procedures.   
Second, the UAGA of 1987 expanded the ways in which a person 
could express donative intent.  Now, a person eighteen or older could make 
an anatomical gift for the purposes expressed in the 1968 version generally, 
or designate one or more specific purposes listed in the 1968 version.45  For 
example, an individual could decide to donate on the condition that his or 
her donation would be used only to provide an organ for another living 
person in need and not for medical research.  By allowing a presumptive 
donor to express donative intent according to specific conditions reflective 
                                                 
43 Siegel, supra note 29, at 933. 
44 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 3(a)(5) (1987). 
45 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act §§ 2(a)(i)-(ii) (1987). 
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of his or her particular intentions, the hope was that more people would be 
willing to donate. 
Third, the UAGA of 1987 clarified the implications of failing to act 
affirmatively to express donative intent.46  Specifically, the UAGA of 1987 
stated that medical personnel was allowed to ask parties on the hierarchical 
list to provide consent on behalf of the decedent if a decedent failed to act 
affirmatively to express donative intent and also failed to act affirmatively 
to express intent contrary to donation.47  In the UAGA of 1968, it was 
understood that medical personnel possessed authority to ask parties on the 
hierarchical list for consent.  In contrast, the UAGA of 1987 used express 
language to create this authority within medical personnel.  The addition of 
the express language in the 1987 version added clarity to the Act which, in 
turn, provided additional security for the people affected by the Act.  
 For example, parties on the hierarchical list were now able to know 
that the decedent never acted to express intent contrary to donation, if the 
parties on the hierarchical list were approached by medical personnel for 
consent.  If the decedent had expressed contrary intent, medical personnel 
were not allowed to ask parties on the hierarchical list for consent.  As a 
result, parties on the hierarchical list would be afforded additional security 
in their decisions when providing consent on behalf of the decedent.  The 
security came from knowing that the decedent never expressed intent 
contrary to donation, if the process for obtaining consent from third parties 
reached the point where the parties were approached by medical personnel 
to provide consent.  This additional security, in turn, allowed more consents 
to be provided.  
Fourth, the UAGA of 1987 mandated that all individuals eighteen 
and over admitted to a hospital be asked upon admittance whether they 
were donors.48  This therefore targeted a subpopulation that had never 
before been targeted by organ donation regulation laws in the United States.  
Moreover, an answer in the affirmative from someone who had never 
before expressed donative intent, equates to one new donor.  As a result of 
this requirement, the number of donors increased.49  The increase is 
significant due to the large number of people who enter a hospital annually, 
many of whom likely had never contemplated donating before.  What is 
more, of all presumptive donors who die, many die after being admitted into 
                                                 
46 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 2(i) (1987). 
47 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 3(a) (1987). 
48 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 5(a) (1987). 
49 Due to the increased number of individuals who were targeted and subsequently 
required to affirmatively state their decision regarding organ donation, additional numbers 
of individuals responded that they would like to be donors, as opposed to the time when 
this entire subpopulation was not expressly questioned at all. 
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a hospital.  Logistically speaking, it is a logical subpopulation to target 
when granting medical personnel authority to expressly ask particular 
individuals whether they are donors.50 
Fifth, the UAGA of 1987 granted coroners the ability to provide 
consent on behalf of the decedent.51  The coroner or medical examiner “may 
release and permit the removal of a part from a body within that official’s 
custody, for transplantation or therapy…”52  This authorization is allowed 
only after two requirements have been met.  First, a reasonable effort to 
locate the parties on the hierarchical list must have failed.  Case law 
illustrates the ambiguity within the term “reasonable effort,”53 which has 
unfortunately permitted some decedents to become donors after coroners 
made very little, if any, effort to obtain consent from family members who 
would have objected.54  Second, the official must be unaware of any 
contrary indication or refusal to donate made by the decedent or parties on 
the hierarchical list.55  This expansion of the coroner’s ability to presume 
consent significantly increases the number of donations made. 
Together, the UAGA of 1968 unified many different attempts at 
regulating organ donations while simultaneously serving as the scaffolding 
required to support the 1987 version.  The latter version, in response to the 
shortfalls of the 1968 version, increased the number of organ donors, 
thereby alleviating the organ shortage.  However, even after the adoption of 
the 1987 version, the organ shortage in the United States remains, as 
illustrated by the monumental discrepancy between the number of organ 
donors and the number of individuals awaiting donations.56  While the 
discrepancy has lessened through the implementation and subsequent 
                                                 
50 In 2009, donations were made from 8,022 decedents.  Of those, 3,179 were made by 
patients who died of a stroke.  In addition, 2,669 of the total number of donations were 
made by patients who died from head trauma.  Both of these causes of death tend to bring 
patients into the confines of a hospital prior to the announcement of death.  So long as the 
patients are legally competent, and age eighteen or older, they are able to provide consent 
to donate upon admittance.  Prior to the UAGA of 1987, this subpopulation of people were 
not expressly asked whether they intended to donate upon arrival at the hospital.  U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, ORGAN PROCUREMENT AND 
TRANSPLANTATION NETWORK, http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/rptData.asp (last 
visited Dec. 1, 2010).  
51 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 4 (1987). 
52 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 4 (1987). 
53 Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc., v. Lavant, 355 S.E.2d 127, 127 (1985) (the parents of 
the infant, who served as a donor, had not expressly objected to their infant child serving as 
a donor; however, “there was no notice of the intended removal, nor any realistic 
opportunity to object”). 
54 Id. 
55 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act §§ 4(a)(2)-(3) (1987). 
56 UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org/ (last visited Dec. 1, 
2010).  
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revision of the UAGA, the opt-in approach is only capable of going so far.  
In the end, it permits a significant percentage of the population to avoid 
ever contemplating the idea of donating.  In addition, it permits decedents to 
never be considered donors only as a result of their inaction to declare 
donative intent, regardless of their underlying desire to donate.  
Alternatively, studies of countries abiding by the opt-out approach indicate 
significantly smaller discrepancies between organ donors and those 
awaiting donations. 
 
II.  OPT-OUT APPROACH SIGNIFICANTLY MINIMIZES DISCREPANCY BETWEEN 
DONORS AND INDIVIDUALS NEEDING ORGAN DONATIONS 
 
 The opt-out approach, thoroughly explained in Samantha Wilcox’s 
law review article discussing the impact of opt-out laws in Pennsylvania57, 
is the opposite of the opt-in approach.58  The opt-out approach states that at 
the time of death, decedents are automatically potential organ donors unless 
the person has “opted-out” by expressing opposition to donation through a 
specific affirmative step taken at some point during his or her lifetime.59  
The opt-out approach successfully increases the number of available 
organs.60  Additionally, countries that use an opt-out approach have a higher 
proportion of multiorgan donors in comparison with countries that utilize an 
opt-in approach.61  The level of success is correlated to the type of opt-out 
approach that a particular country adopts.62  For example, countries such as 
Austria, France, and Singapore have adopted a strict form of the opt-out 
approach,63 meaning that no consideration is given to the wishes of family 
members of the decedent at, or after, the time of death.  Alternatively, softer 
forms of the opt-out approach may consider objections made by family 
members following a person’s death, although no efforts are made to seek 
out the family members at the time of death in any variation of the opt-out 
approach.64  Because the softer forms require additional opportunities for 
intent contrary to donation to be considered, they result in fewer donations 
overall when compared to stricter forms.65 
                                                 
57 Wilcox, supra note 3, at 935.  
58 Richards, supra note 9, at 378.  
59 Wilcox, supra note 3, at 938. 
60 Id. 
61 Paul Michielsen, Presumed Consent to Organ Donations: 10 years’ experience in 
Belgium, 89 J. ROYAL SOC’Y MED. 665, 665 (Dec., 1996). 
62 Wilcox, supra note 3, at 938. 
63 Richards, supra note 9, at 389-92. 
64 Wilcox, supra note 3, at 938. 
65 Id.  But see id. at 939 (suggests that the positive results obtained in countries that 
utilize the strictest forms of the opt-out approach may be attributable to “alternative 
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A.  Strict Opt-Out Approach Allows for the Largest Number of Donors Per 
Capita 
 
 Austria’s approach is the strictest among all countries that have 
adopted an opt-out approach.66  In fact, the physician attending to the 
decedent is under no obligation to discuss the donation with the decedent’s 
family.  The only way a decedent would not be considered a donor is if the 
person, while alive, affirmatively objected to donation in such a way that at 
the time of death, the attending physician was unequivocally aware of the 
decedent’s prior objection.67  
 This strict approach to opting-out explains why Austria has the 
highest rate of cadaver donors per year.68  Specifically, Austria has the 
highest mean retrieval rate per million inhabitants for kidneys, hearts, livers, 
pancreases, and lungs out of all countries that have adopted the opt-out 
approach.69    
 In countries that adopt the opt-out approach, including Austria, there 
is minimal, if any, apprehension toward the approach expressed by the 
public.70  The lack of apprehension, combined with the default rule that all 
citizens are organ donors, has undoubtedly allowed countries with an opt-
out approach to significantly surpass the United States in decreasing the gap 
between the number of organs donated and the demand for organs.   
 
1. Strict Opt-Out Approach Raises a Range of Concerns 
 
 This gap remains prominent in the United States due to the 
opposition toward the opt-out approach expressed among particular citizens 
of our country.  Four main concerns have developed among Americans.  
First, an opt-out approach may raise significant moral concerns if 
implemented within our country’s unique set of ideals.  Second, many 
people remain ignorant about issues relating to organ donation and, as a 
result, a large number of people who oppose donation may be unaware of 
their right to opt-out if the United States were to adopt the opt-out approach.  
Third, the opt-out approach may encroach on the religious freedom 
promised to Americans through our Constitution.  Fourth, concerns have 
been expressed wherein adopting such a supportive attitude toward donation 
                                                                                                                            
sources, such as increased hospital participation, more active transplant teams, and public 
education campaigns.”). 
66 Teagarden, supra note 12, at 725.  
67 Id. 
68 Wilcox, supra note 3, at 938. 
69 Michielsen, supra note 60. 
70 Id. at 666. 
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may coincide with premature determinations of death for the purposes of 
transplanting needed organs into waiting patients.  While each concern has 
its merits, increasing education surrounding the opt-out approach and its 
corresponding procedures would minimize concerns, as discussed infra.  
This would subsequently allow our country to adopt the opt-out approach 
which would minimize the discrepancy between donors and needed organs. 
 
a. Moral Concerns 
 
 The first concern related to adopting an opt-out approach in our 
country considers moral challenges.  Specifically, the concern states that 
adopting the opt-out approach would be taking advantage of Americans 
who are not inclined to act affirmatively one way or another to express their 
beliefs regarding donation.71  The numbers taken through polls in 1985 and 
199372 indicate that a high percentage of Americans not only support the 
idea of organ donation, but claim they wish to personally serve as donors.  
Although, the percentage of Americans that has acted affirmatively in 
response to their beliefs has been significantly less.73  This discrepancy 
illustrates that Americans hold beliefs they are unwilling to support through 
affirmative expression.  What is more, it seems immoral to take advantage 
of Americans’ unwillingness to affirmatively support their beliefs.74 
 However, the response to this concern is significant.  In fact, the opt-
out approach is the perfect solution to Americans’ failure to act 
affirmatively to back up the beliefs that they truly possess.  By making 
organ donation the default rule we are eliminating the requirement that 
Americans must act affirmatively in order for their desires to donate to be 
honored.  As a result, the opt-out approach makes it easier for Americans to 
have their desires to donate granted.  For those who feel strongly against 
donating, it follows that a strong desire not to donate would be enough for a 
person to act affirmatively to opt-out.  Thus, the opt-out approach allows 
the default to be a rule that significantly alleviates the tragedy associated 
with the high number of deaths of individuals awaiting donations. 
 Moreover, by adopting an opt-out approach, a corresponding 
transfer in responsibility from the decedent’s family to the attending 
physician occurs, regarding whether to make an organ donation.  In the 
                                                 
71 Richards, supra note 9, at 387.  
72 1985 and 1993 Gallup Polls. 
73 Id. 
74 Liddy, supra note 15, at 844. John Stuart Mill explains that any society that engages 
in regulating an individual’s right of self-determination, is a society wherein the people are 
not truly free.  This freedom is lost to the regulation of individual right’s which, as a result, 
conforms coercive regulation regardless of the form of government in place within the 
society.  The coercive regulation in effect does not respect individual rights.  Id. 
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instance wherein a decedent has not acted affirmatively during his or her 
lifetime to declare donative intent within our current opt-in approach, the 
decedent’s family is forced to make the untimely decision on behalf of the 
decedent.  The pressure of this decision is undeniably difficult for the 
family members of a decedent.  Being forced to make this decision mere 
moments after a person dies seems nearly inhumane, and thus immoral in its 
own way.  Alternatively, the opt-out approach takes this difficult step out of 
the family’s hands and places it into a physician’s hands, leaving the family 
to mourn the loss of the decedent absent the pressure of having to make 
such a significant decision. 
 
b. Procedural Concerns 
 
 The second major concern regarding adopting an opt-out approach 
relates to Americans’ ignorance in regards to organ donation generally.  
This ignorance becomes particularly problematic when people in an opt-out 
approach do not wish to donate but who are nonetheless unaware of the 
requirement of making an affirmative action to express their decision.  This 
concern has strong ties to the concern listed above.  Particularly, if an opt-
out approach were adopted in the United States, Americans who do not 
wish to donate may nonetheless be presumed to be donors only as a result 
of their failure to act affirmatively to express their decision.  However, 
distinguishable from the concern posed above, this subset of Americans 
who would fail to act affirmatively would not do so out of laziness, but 
rather, out of ignorance of the issue of organ donation and specifically 
ignorance concerning the procedure required to express their decision. 
 While sympathy would exist for individuals mistakenly believed to 
be organ donors in an opt-out system only as a result of their procedural 
ignorance, the sympathy should not be overstated.  It is fair to hold people 
to possess a particular level of awareness in relation to their own health and 
to the inevitability of death.  Particularly in the United States, one’s own 
death seems to be a topic too taboo to discuss.  However, this is not a reason 
sufficient enough to hold that as a result, we should not be held to take a 
moment to contemplate what we wish to be done with our organs when we 
die (not if we die).  Furthermore, as discussed below, providing Americans 
with education surrounding opt-out procedures would minimize this 
concern altogether.    
 This moment of contemplation should be expected of us, if not for 
the sole reason that most Americans expect that, should they ever be in the 
unfortunate position of needing an organ transplant, there will be someone 
willing to donate.  In fact, it seems as though Americans believe it is their 
right to be considered as an organ donee, should they require an organ.  It 
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follows from this feeling of entitlement to receive, that there should exist a 
responsibility to both consider being a donor and affirmatively expressing 
the decision made regarding donation. 
In total, the opt-out approach does not take advantage of anyone’s 
ignorance because a person’s ignorance regarding this topic is, in the first 
place, unacceptable.  Americans know that if we ever need an organ, we 
have the option of being considered as an organ donee.  It follows that we 
should be held to know our rights concerning opting-out of an organ 
donation approach that requires an affirmative step to express intent 
contrary to donation. 
 
c. Religious Concerns 
 
 The third concern with the opt-out approach considers the possibility 
that the approach may stifle religious freedom which, due to its tie to the 
Constitution, holds significant weight.  The First Amendment states that the 
government is prohibited from interfering with an individual’s right to 
exercise his or her religion.75  It follows that any government action that 
interferes with an individual’s religious freedom should be struck down for 
violating the Constitution.  Therefore, the relationship between the 
protections afforded by the Constitution and the religions that prohibit 
donation may be problematic in adopting an opt-out approach.  Specifically, 
several religions, including the Gypsy, Shinto, and Jewish religions, either 
prohibit donation generally or prohibit particular aspects inherent within 
donation.     
 For example, the Gypsies disagree with organ donation due to 
reasons relating to their belief in protecting the afterlife.  They believe that a 
person’s soul retraces its steps for one year after death.  In order to do so, 
the body must remain intact so that it has the physical components 
necessary to make this journey during the afterlife.76   
Alternatively, the Shinto and Jewish religions view donation as a 
form of injury and mutilation to the dead.  Specifically, the Shinto view 
donation as a serious crime because they believe it is equivalent to injuring 
a dead body.77  Judaism, on the other hand, honors several specific burial 
rights that conflict with aspects of donation.  The concept of “issur 
hana’ah78” prohibits deriving any benefit from a cadaver.79  A related 
                                                 
75 U.S. CONST. art. I. 
76U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
http://organdonor.gov/donation/religious_views.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2010). 
77 Id. 
78 Translated, this phrase means “the prohibition against deriving any benefit from a 
dead body.”  Id. 
1-Dec-10] Opt-In or Opt-Out? 15 
concept, “kevurat hamet,”80 holds that a decedent must be buried with all 
parts intact.81  In fact, doing otherwise is essentially mutilation of the dead, 
according to Judaism.82  Thus, due to the potential religious conflict 
inherent in adopting the opt-out approach in the United States, proponents 
of its adoption suggest including an express exemption for religious 
purposes.83  Supplemental to that, increased education surrounding opt-out 
procedures would help alleviate opposition to the approach based upon 
protecting religious freedom.84   
 
d. Ethical Concerns 
 
Lastly is the concern that the opt-out approach will influence 
physicians to prematurely announce the death of a presumptive donor so 
that his or her organs may be removed and transplanted to an awaiting 
presumptive donee.  However, several measures exist to assure this would 
never happen.  First, all fifty states as well as Washington, D. C., have 
adopted the Uniform Determination of Death Act (UDDA), which 
recognizes death at the time when the brain irreversibly ceases to function.85  
Second, the relationship between those who provide medical care for the 
patient and those who extract organs or tissue from the decedent for 
transplantation purposes is specifically designed to protect the health and 
safety of the patient first and foremost. 
Advancements in medical technology have allowed for humans to 
be kept alive using life supporting equipment; however, these advances 
have blurred the line between life and death.  The UDDA states that “an 
individual who has sustained either irreversible cessation of circulatory and 
respiratory functions or irreversible cessation of all functions of the entire 
brain, including the brain stem, is dead.”86   The UDDA goes on to say that 
each states’ medical association should develop and adopt hospital policies 
and protocols that reinforce the definition of death provided in the UDDA.87   
                                                                                                                            
79 Khalil Jaafar Khalil, A Sight of Relief: Invalidating Cadaveric Corneal Donation 
Laws Via the Free Exercise Clause, 6 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 159, 161 (2002). 
80 Translated, this means “the requirement to bury a dead person and all his parts in 
tact.”  U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 
http://organdonor.gov/donation/religious_views.htm (last visited Dec. 1, 2010). 
81 Khalil, supra note 78.  
82 Id. 
83 Alexander Powhida, Forced Organ Donation: The Presumed Consent to Organ 
Donation Laws of the Various States and the United States Constitution, 9 ALB. L.J. SCI. & 
TECH. 349, 361 (1999). 
84 See infra, at Part III.C. 
85 Unif. Determination of Death Act (1981). 
86 Dead Bodies, 22A AM. JUR. 2D § 98 (1988). 
87 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 1 comment (1987). 
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The concept of brain death relates to studies seeking to determine 
exactly when a person has entered into an irreversible coma.  These studies 
were first conducted in 1968 by an Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard 
Medical School.88  The results provided a particular collection of qualities 
that, when possessed together, signify the moment at which an individual 
has entered into an irreversible coma.  These qualities include unreceptivity, 
unresponsiveness, and the absence of spontaneous movements, breathing, 
and reflexes.89  Furthermore, these qualities must persist for a twenty-four 
hour period.90  At that time, the cessation of the other organs becomes not 
only inevitable, but imminent.91   
Cases involving anencephalic infants illustrate that physicians 
strictly adhere to the UDDA requirements concerning the unequivocal 
determination of death prior to removing organs for donation purposes.92  
Anencephalic infants are born without most of their brain; however, the 
infants are capable of staying alive for a brief period of time after birth 
because they are born with a portion of their brain stem which allows them 
to breathe.93  As a result, these infants are able to stay alive for up to a few 
months,94 although because they do not physically possess other portions of 
their brain, there is no possible way they could ever be capable of higher 
brain functioning.95   
Over the course of their lifetime, the infants’ respiratory system 
begins its slow progression toward complete failure.96  By the time the 
infant satisfies the brain-death criteria naturally, the infant’s organs have 
gone a period of time without receiving adequate oxygen such that their 
organs are incapable of being donated.97  Moreover, donating infant organs 
serves a special purpose in society because 1,500 infants die each year 
while waiting for a transplant.98  What makes this number so significant is 
that infants are physically capable of receiving organs only from other 
                                                 




92 In re Estates of Perry, 40 P.3d 492, 497 (Okla. App. Div. 3, 2001); In re T.A.C.P., 
609 So.2d 588, 588  (Fla. 1992); 1 HEALTH L. PRAC. GUIDE § 15:10 (2010). 
93 Philippe Ducor, The Legal Status of Human Materials, 44 DRAKE L. REV. 195, 216 
(1995). 
94 Id. 
95 See Faber ES, Functional Interplay Between NMDA Receptors, SK Channels and 
Voltage-Gated Ca2+ Channels Regulates Synaptic Excitability in the Medial Prefrontal 
Cortex, 588 J. PHYSIOL. 1281, 1281-92 (2010). 
96http://law.jrank.org/pages/8948/Organ-Donation-Law-Should-Dying-Babies-Be-
Organ-Donors.html (last visited Dec. 1, 2010). 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
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infants due to the small size of their bodies.  Therefore, some individuals 
argue that, upon parental consent, an anencephalic infant should be able to 
donate organs prior to complete respiratory failure even though the infant 
still maintains some functioning of the brain stem.     
However, the requirements for being capable of donation are not 
met by anencephalic infants.  Specifically, anencephalic infants maintain 
the functioning of their brain stem and as a result, cannot be declared 
completely brain dead.99  From a donative standpoint, it is unfortunate that 
the final declaration of brain death in an anencephalic infant cannot occur 
until after their slow respiratory decline.  By that time, their organs are no 
longer capable of transplantation due to the time spent without adequate 
oxygen.  However, the UDDA requirement of cessation of the entire brain 
prior to donation must be strictly enforced.  This strict enforcement 
emphasizes the importance placed upon meeting all requirements of being 
“dead” prior to donation. 
In addition to the incapability of anencephalic infants to serve as 
donors, the relationship between the physicians who declare a patient dead 
and the physicians who extract organs from a patient, also illustrates 
measures taken to assure premature death announcements, for donative 
purposes, do not occur.  Specifically, the UAGA of 1987 requires that the 
physicians in charge of caring for the patient until the time of death are not 
allowed to participate in any decisions or procedures involved in organ 
donations, and vice-versa.100  By requiring that the announcement of death 
and the subsequent removal of organs or tissues be conducted by two 
different groups of individuals, the Act insures that physicians will not 
prematurely declare death for the purpose of harvesting a patient’s organs.   
 
B.  Soft Version of the Opt-Out Approach Produces Fewer Donors but also 
Fewer Concerns than Strict Version and More Donors than Opt-In 
Approach 
 
 Pennsylvania pioneered a soft approach to opt-out legislation that 
concerns donations of particular parts of the body.  It is considered a “soft 
approach” rather than a “strict approach” because the coroner must take 
specific steps prior to assuming donative intent that are not required from 
the strict approach.  These steps serve as a condition precedent to the 
coroner’s ability to remove anything from the decedent’s body in a soft 
approach model.  Pennsylvania Consolidated Statutes § 8641 of Title 20 
states that 
 
                                                 
99 Ducor, supra note 92.  
100 Unif. Anatomical Gift Act § 8(b) (1987). 
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On request from an authorized official of an eye bank for 
corneal tissue, a coroner or medical examiner may permit the removal 
of corneal tissue if all of the following apply: 
(1)  The decedent from whom the tissue is to be removed 
died under circumstances requiring an inquest. 
(2)  The coroner or medical examiner has made a reasonable 
effort to contact persons listed in section 8611 (relating to persons 
who may execute anatomical gift). 
(3)  No objection by a person listed in section 8611 is known 
by the coroner or medical examiner. 
(4)  The removal of the corneal tissue will not interfere with 
the subsequent course of an investigation or autopsy or alter the 
decedent’s postmortem facial appearance.101 
 
 The first element requires that a cadaver be subject to an autopsy 
prior to a coroner or medical examiner presuming donative intent.102  
Although autopsy rates are difficult to calculate due to a lack of systematic 
reporting, it has been estimated that autopsies were performed on only 8.3% 
of cadavers in 2003.103  Therefore, the first requirement of the Pennsylvania 
Statute significantly decreases the number of decedents, not already legally 
recognized as donors, capable of being considered for corneal tissue 
donation. 
 The second element of the Pennsylvania Statute requires that a 
reasonable effort be made to contact individuals listed in section 8611 who 
are able to provide donative consent on behalf of the decedent.104  These 
individuals include the decedent’s spouse, guardian at time of death, adult 
son or daughter, adult brother or sister, either parent of the decedent, or any 
other person with authority or obligation to dispose of the body.105  The list 
of individuals is rather extensive, affording the coroner or medical examiner 
ample opportunity to be able to contact at least one individual on the list.  
However, section 8641 fails to expressly state the purpose behind the 
coroner or medical examiner making an effort to contact the individuals 
listed in section 8611.  Consequently, two different interpretations of 
section 8641 exist, each of which could potentially result in a significantly 
different outcome than the other.  On the one hand, a coroner could 
understand the purpose of contacting the individuals listed in section 8611 
as being to gain consent on behalf of the decedent to donate corneal tissue.  
                                                 
101 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 8641 (1994). 
102 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 8641(1) (1994). 
103 Elizabeth C. Burton, Autopsy Rate and Physician Attitudes Toward Autopsy, 
EMEDICINE, http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/1705948-overview (last updated Apr. 
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104 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 8641(2) (1994). 
105 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 8611(b) (1999). 
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Therefore, the “reasonable effort” could be understood to be sufficient as 
soon as one individual provides consent, meaning there would be no 
purpose to continue trying to contact other individuals on the list.  
Alternatively, and in conjunction with the third element of the statute, the 
coroner could understand the purpose of contacting the individuals as being 
to determine that no one listed in section 8611 objects to the decedent 
serving as a corneal tissue donor.  This understanding would seem to imply 
that a reasonable effort be deemed sufficient only after every person on the 
list is attempted to be located, since any one individual could provide an 
objection.  Furthermore, section 8641 does not address whether the coroner 
must attempt to contact the individuals listed in section 8611 in any 
particular order, which adds more ambiguity to the coroner’s responsibility 
provided in the second element of section 8641. 
In addition, exactly what conforms a “reasonable effort” has been 
subject to debate, not only in Pennsylvania, but in other states that have 
adopted similar soft approaches to corneal tissue donation as well, such as 
California.  For example, in Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, the California 
Supreme Court ruled that further consideration should be afforded to the 
appropriateness of allowing a coroner to remove corneal tissue from a child 
decedent, when the parents are not notified beforehand.106  An amendment 
was made to the applicable California law in 1998, requiring the coroner to 
obtain written or verbal consent from the next of kin before removing 
corneal tissue from the decedent.107    
 It is likely that the attempts made are required merely to be 
“reasonable,” rather than “successful,” due to the fact that corneal tissue is 
particularly perishable.  As a result, a decision regarding removal of the 
tissue must be made very soon after the decedent’s death in order for there 
to exist an opportunity to transplant the tissue prior to the point wherein it is 
no longer transplantable.  Thus, the “reasonable effort” standard honors the 
next of kin’s property right in the decedent’s body,108 while simultaneously 
honoring presumptive donees whose vision can be restored through corneal 
donations.109   
 The third element of the Pennsylvania Statute requires that neither 
the coroner nor medical examiner know of any objection made by an 
                                                 
106 Newman v. Sathyavaglswaran, 287 F.3d 786, 786 (9th Cir. 2002).  Interestingly, 
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individual capable of providing donative consent on behalf of the 
decedent.110  This element appears to further limit the opportunity for a 
coroner to provide donative consent on behalf of the decedent.  Typically, 
the individuals on this list are capable of providing donative consent on 
behalf of the decedent; however, in this particular statute, their authority is 
expressly provided as relating to their ability to make objections to 
donations on behalf of the decedent.  While this seems to protect the 
decedent from being mistakenly assumed to be a corneal tissue donor, 
ambiguity within the clause appears to dilute this protection.  Specifically, 
the clause does not address the objection itself.  It therefore remains 
unknown whether it is sufficient for the third party to object to donation 
generally, or rather, whether the third party must object specifically to 
corneal tissue donation. 
 The fourth element of the Pennsylvania Statute requires two things.  
First, the removal of the corneal tissue cannot interfere with the autopsy.111  
However, due to the minimal invasion into the body that corneal tissue 
removal requires,112 it is unlikely that the procedure would interfere with an 
autopsy.  Second, the removal cannot alter the decedent’s facial 
appearance.113  Again, the minimal invasion into the decedent’s body likely 
does not result in an alteration of the facial appearance of the decedent.  
However, speculation may surround the purpose of this element.  For 
example, it could be argued that the purpose of this element is essentially to 
hide the fact from the decedent’s family that the decedent’s corneal tissue 
has been removed.114   
Responses to this criticism, however, seem to provide a legitimate 
reason behind requiring that the procedure maintain the facial appearance of 
the decedent.  For example, perhaps the coroner or medical examiner is in 
the best position to ensure that the family does not have to contemplate 
undertaking this decision during a fraught time.  Moreover, it is not 
“hiding” anything from the family, because the family has the preemptive 
                                                 
110 20 Pa.C.S.A. § 8641(3) (1994). 
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right to know and understand the donation laws of their respective state.  
Every family should understand that, if they reside in a state that follows an 
opt-out approach to any type of organ or tissue donation, a decedent’s body 
may be used for transplant purposes unless the decedent him or herself 
objected to donation during his or her lifetime.  Furthermore, family 
members of the decedent are welcome to inquire about donations made by 
the decedent, should they wish to know. 
 
III.  INCREASED EDUCATION ADDRESSES A RANGE OF CONCERNS REGARDING 
THE OPT-OUT APPROACH 
 
 Each moral, procedural, and religious concern could be addressed by 
incorporating increased education surrounding the opt-out approach itself, 
as well as the corresponding procedures.  While other countries currently 
utilizing the opt-out approach do not highlight this educational requirement, 
this is a requirement our country will need to adhere to as a result of the 
additional freedoms we afford our citizens.     
In particular, Americans pride themselves in living within a country 
that affords each individual specific rights.  Assuming each individual is a 
donor may be viewed as simultaneously taking away the right each 
individual possesses in determining how they want their remains handled 
after they die.115  As a result, a default rule designating each individual as a 
donor may impede on important rights such that adopting an opt-out 
approach would be immoral.  Additional morality concerns relate to 
Americans’ ignorance regarding the procedure required to opt-out.  It is 
possible that this ignorance may be taken advantage of in order to create 
more donors.   Another right we afford Americans is the right of religious 
freedom.  This right correlates with particular concerns related to the opt-
out approach, as discussed supra116.  However, if the United States wishes 
to take after the countries that have obtained the results we strive for 
regarding decreasing the discrepancy between donors and individuals 
needing organs, the United States must adopt some form of the opt-out 
approach.   
 Increased education must continually stress exactly what an opt-out 
approach is, as well as exactly what it is not.  The opt-out approach 
establishes donative intent in every individual through a default rule that 
works in conjunction with an opt-out option.  Thus, each person is 
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essentially given the choice between choosing to be a donor and choosing 
not to be a donor.  The opt-out approach merely requires those who do not 
wish to be a donor to complete a simple affirmative act reflective of their 
contrary intent to donation.  What the opt-out approach is not, is an 
approach that forces everyone to be an organ donor.  Additionally, the opt-
out approach is not an approach that takes away an individual’s ability to 
freely express his or her religion or to hold moral and ethical viewpoints 
that are contrary to organ donation.  Rather, for the approach to work in a 
way that respects autonomous decisions regarding donative intent, all that 
must be emphasized is education surrounding the simple opt-out 
procedures.  This would guarantee that moral, procedural, and ethical 
concerns be minimized while religious freedom remains protected. 
 
A.  Increased Education Responds to Moral Concerns 
 
 Forming educational programs surrounding the opt-out approach can 
work to minimize moral concerns presented in Part II.A(1)(a).  These 
concerns relate to Americans’ current failure in expressing donative 
intent.117  As a result, it is possible that Americans who do not wish to 
donate will also fail to act affirmatively to express intent contrary to 
donation, required in the opt-out approach.  Failure to act affirmatively to 
express contrary intent in an opt-out approach, in contrast to an opt-in 
approach, results in an individual becoming a donor.  This result could be 
viewed as taking advantage of Americans not inclined to act affirmatively 
one way or another.  Of course, some might argue that it is particularly 
immoral to take advantage of these Americans in a way that infringes upon 
their right to keep their body “whole” after death.  Whereas it is one thing to 
presume an individual who has not acted affirmatively is not a donor, as in 
the opt-in approach, it is a whole other story to presume that an individual 
who has not acted affirmatively is a donor.  This difference rests upon the 
invasion into the decedent’s body that occurs only when we presume 
donation, rather than when we presume intent contrary to donation.  
Therefore, legally permitting inaction to signify consent to this invasion into 
a decedent’s body may be viewed as immoral. 
 However, this Article argues that allowing inaction to signify 
consent is not immoral, but rather, is a necessity in decreasing the number 
of preventable deaths which are, in their own way, immoral.  The 
immorality connected to the idea of excusing preventable deaths, should be 
of utmost concern when establishing an approach to organ donation.  
Specifically, the primary goal of adopting an approach to organ donation 
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should be to decrease the discrepancy between donors and individuals 
needing organs.  The secondary goal should be to accomplish this in a way 
that respects individual rights.  Adopting an opt-out approach accomplishes 
the primary goal more so than the opt-in approach.  Furthermore, with 
increased education surrounding the opt-out approach and its corresponding 
procedures, the secondary goal is met as well. 
If it is important enough to an individual to refrain from being an 
organ donor, it should be just as important to that individual to take the 
initiative to opt-out.  If each individual is educated regarding the opt-out 
approach and its corresponding opt-out procedure, the only reason an 
individual would be recognized as a donor against their genuine desire not 
to donate would be because that individual willingly chose not to opt-out.  
Keeping the primary goal of adopting a particular approach to organ 
donation in mind, if an individual willingly chooses not to act affirmatively 
to express their underlying intent, the particular approach should not be 
expected to nonetheless respect the individual’s underlying intent..  Just as 
humans cannot read the minds of other humans, it should not be expected 
that an approach to organ donation be able to read the minds of the 
individuals it effects.  With such minimal steps required to express intent 
contrary to donation, an individual should be held to the requirement of 
acting affirmatively in an opt-out approach if he or she wishes to have his or 
her underlying desire against donation honored.  Educating each individual 
on the opt-out procedure transfers the responsibility to the individual to opt-
out if he or she so chooses, such that failure to do so may still morally allow 
for the assumption that the individual consents to donation. 
A crucial aspect of this theory, however, is that education 
surrounding the opt-out approach and its corresponding procedures be 
provided to every single individual.  This way, failure to affirmatively act to 
express intent contrary to donation can fairly be understood to signify an 
individual’s donative intent, or conscious decision, not to opt-out, rather 
than ignorance of the requirement to opt-out.  Of course, educating every 
individual about the opt-out approach may be too lofty of a goal.  To 
accomplish this goal, education would have to come in nearly an infinite 
amount of formats.  It would have to be understood by each individual, 
regardless of the language he or she speaks, his or her age, intellect, and 
level of comprehension.  Furthermore, it would have to be presented to 
individuals everywhere, whether they reside in the heart of Manhattan or in 
the extreme isolation of the Rocky Mountains.  To claim that this is possible 
would be failing to take into consideration all that is required to accomplish 
the goal of providing education to each and every individual. 
However, while failing to educate each individual would 
simultaneously be infringing on their right to determine what they wish to 
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have done with their body after they die, this Article maintains that 
forfeiting that right for some individuals is balanced by the right of other 
individuals to receive organs necessary for their survival.  After all, the 
most isolated or incompetent individuals are incapable of knowing other 
rights as well.  In this situation, their ignorance is indirectly capable of 
saving lives. 
 
B.  Increased Education Responds to Procedural Concerns 
 
 Currently, our opt-in procedures do not allow all of those who 
support organ donation to become organ donors, as reflected in statistics 
collected through the 1993 Gallup polls.118  This idea reflects the lack of 
education put out into the community surrounding the opt-in procedures.  
Alternatively, if we switch to an opt-out approach, those who currently 
support donation but have not acted affirmatively to do so would become 
donors by default.  Simultaneously increasing the amount and frequency of 
education provided to the community would also allow current non-donors 
to be forced to consider donation, many of whom would consider it for the 
first time.  Overall, the switch to the opt-out approach, as well as the 
increased education provided to the community, would work to create an 
overall increase in the number of donors within our country.  
Additionally, it is our responsibility as American citizens to know 
our rights and to know the laws.  Just as not knowing a criminal law is not 
an accepted excuse for not abiding by it, not knowing the laws and 
procedures surrounding an opt-out approach should not be a reason to label 
it procedurally unjust.   
 
C.  Increased Education Responds to Religious Concerns 
 
 If the United States were to adopt an opt-out approach, the country 
would be forced to supplement the adoption with increased education 
surrounding opt-out procedures due to the religious freedom our country 
promises its citizens and the possibility of the opt-out approach infringing 
on this freedom.  The increased education should therefore be focused 
particularly at religious communities.  In turn, overall resistance from the 
public regarding an opt-out approach may be decreased.  Minimizing 
resistance may allow the opt-out approach to function more efficiently, as 
countries that currently use the opt-out approach are conformed of 
communities that do not express apprehension or negative attitudes toward 
the approach.119  
                                                 
118 1993 Gallup Poll. 
119 Michielsen, supra note 60, at 666. 
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 Criticisms of this technique include its inability to reach every 
individual who may have a potential religious objection to donation.  
Specifically, not every religious individual belongs to a religious 
organization or establishment and therefore, those who do not may not be 
targeted by this technique.  Hopefully, however, increased education to the 
population in general would reach individuals that do not belong to a 
religious organization or establishment. 
 
D.  Increased Education is Essential Regardless of Which Approach is Used 
 
 Increasing education relating to affirmative actions required to 
express either donative intent, in an opt-in approach,120 or intent contrary to 
donation, in an opt-out approach,121 would help assure that individuals’ 
underlying desires are honored upon death.  Two approaches illustrate how 
to provide more educational opportunities.  First, an individual approach 
can seek to provide education through creating educational requirements 
that must be met in order for an individual to obtain particular goals.  
Second, an institutional approach can seek to increase education among all 
individuals belonging to an institution by requiring the institution as a 
whole to receive and provide education to its members.  
 
1. Education Provided Through an Individual Approach 
 
An individual approach would be able to, ideally, require that 
education serve as a condition precedent to reaching particular events that 
individuals in our country value.  For example, obtaining a minimum 
amount of education surrounding the opt-out approach and its 
corresponding procedures could serve as a condition precedent to obtaining 
a high school degree, receiving tax returns, passing a driver’s test, visiting a 
doctor, or applying for health insurance.  In particular, it seems logical to 
require health care applicants to receive a minimum level of education 
relating to organ donation upon adhering to new health care laws.  Because 
these health care laws require applicants to apply for health care coverage 
annually, individuals could be kept up to date with current trends and 
changes in organ donation laws and approaches by being required to meet 
educational requirements each year.  Although this educational requirement 
would utilize various resources and create additional costs, it must be made 
available in order for our country to effectively adopt an opt-out approach 
                                                 
120 Bernard T. Kwitowski, Learning From Each Other: Combining Strategies to End 
the Organ Shortage, 9 J. MED. & L. 141, 144 (2005). 
121 Teagarden, supra note 12, at 699. 
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while simultaneously continue to respect the unique freedoms our country 
affords its citizens.   
 
 
2. Education Provided Through an Institutional Approach 
 
Distinct from the approach that seeks to target individuals, the 
institutional approach seeks to target individuals on a larger scale.  
Specifically, by creating educational requirements at an institutional level, 
costs of providing education may be decreased.  This can be accomplished 
by targeting entire groups of individuals, such as individuals who belong to 
religious organizations or establishments, as well as through adopting state 
statutes that create minimum education requirements for all state residents.   
Institutions, especially religious communities that may have a 
particularly high interest in opting-out, can be targeted as a whole in regards 
to educational requirements through specific avenues unique to the 
institution.  For example, religious organizations and establishments have a 
unique status in American society that incorporates distinctive treatment 
under tax law.122  To receive this special treatment, religious organizations 
and establishments must follow specific tax filing procedures.  Therefore, 
by creating a condition precedent, in the form of a completed educational 
requirement, to receiving tax breaks, it can be assured that religious 
organizations and establishments will receive education regarding opt-out 
procedures.  Using the avenue of tax procedures to provide education to 
religious organizations and establishments can increase the likelihood that 
religious populations, likely to possess intentions contrary to donation, 
become educated regarding their right to opt-out and exactly how to express 
this intent.     
In addition to targeting institutions specifically, states may adopt 
statutes that create educational requirements that target residents of an 
entire state.  Delaware state law currently utilizes the institutional approach 
while illustrating the importance behind educating the public about organ 
donation and corresponding procedures.  The state law reveals that 
regardless of whether an opt-in or opt-out approach is used, education 
surrounding procedures to act affirmatively either way must be increased.  
Delaware currently requires that the state create a board to be in charge of 
particular duties related to meeting educational requirements.123  These 
                                                 
122 INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Tax Guide for Churches and Religious 
Organizations, http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p1828.pdf (2009). 
123 16 Del.C.S.A. § 2730(a).  This law requires that an Organ and Tissue Donor 
Awareness Board be created.  Furthermore, the law states that 
The members of the board shall include a representative of the 
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duties include developing donor awareness programs to educate Delaware 
residents on donor registration procedures.124  Additionally, the law 
establishes a fund to be utilized to increase education surrounding organ 
donation awareness among Delaware residents and particularly among 
secondary school students.125   
Over time, studies of this law can reveal how it has impacted the 
number of organ donors in the state.  However, regardless of the success the 
Delaware law will have on increasing the number of organ donors, 
unfortunately, the law is not capable of reaching the level of success our 
country could achieve if the United States were to switch to an opt-out 




Our country must make drastic changes to the approach used to deal 
with organ donations.  Our current opt-in approach clearly fails to 
significantly minimize the discrepancy between donors and individuals 
needing organs.127  Therefore, the solution to addressing this discrepancy 
lies within determining how to switch to an opt-out approach.  Doing so 
would require considering the many moral, procedural, religious, and 
ethical concerns related to an opt-out approach; however, incorporating 
increased education surrounding the opt-out approach would sufficiently 
address these concerns.  The disheartening reality is that there exist far more 
cadaver organs at any given time, than organs that are needed by individuals 
on the organ waitlist.  Therefore, changes must be made such that these 
cadaver organs are made available to those in need.  While requiring an 
organ for survival may seem like a scenario far removed from our daily 
lives, we ought to pay it great attention because in the time it took you to 
read this Article, approximately five individuals were added to the Organ 
Procurement and Transplantation Network’s waitlist.128  This is in addition 
                                                                                                                            
federally certified organ procurement organization serving Delaware, a 
representative of an eye bank located in Delaware, a transplant 
recipient, a donor family member, a physician having special interest in 
area of transplantation, a current officer, employee or board member of 
a Delaware acute care general hospital, 1 representative each from the 
Department of Health and Social Services, the Department of 
Education and the Division of Motor Vehicles. 
Id. 
124 16 Del.C.S.A. § 2730(b)(1). 
125 16 Del.C.S.A § 2730(b)(1)-(2). 
126 Vanrenterghern et al., Effect of a Presumed Consent Law on Organ Retrieval in 
Belgium, 22 TRANS. PROC. 2078, 2078-79 (1990).  See Michielsen, supra note 60.  
127 Kwitowski, supra note 118, at 146. 
128 This estimation assumes it took the reader one hour to read this article.  The estimation 
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to the more than 100,000 individuals already on the waitlist.129  In total, as 
time progresses and the waitlist continues to grow, it becomes more likely 
that you will personally know someone on the waitlist, whether it be an 
acquaintance, a friend, a family member, or even yourself.   
 
* * * 
                                                                                                                            
was made using a mathematical formula that incorporated numerical values taken from 
http://optn.transplant.hrsa.gov/latestData/rptData.asp (last visited Dec. 1, 2010).  This 
website states that in 2009, 50,320 candidates were added to the Organ Procurement and 
Transplantation Network’s waiting list.  Therefore, on average, 5.74 candidates were added 
to the list each hour in 2009.  See id. 
129 UNITED NETWORK FOR ORGAN SHARING, http://www.unos.org/ (last visited Dec. 1, 
2010).   
